Thomas P. Flint, DIVINE PROVIDENCE: THE MOLINIST ACCOUNT by Hasker, William
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 16 Issue 2 Article 9 
4-1-1999 
Flint, DIVINE PROVIDENCE: THE MOLINIST ACCOUNT 
William Hasker 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Hasker, William (1999) "Flint, DIVINE PROVIDENCE: THE MOLINIST ACCOUNT," Faith and Philosophy: 
Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 16 : Iss. 2 , Article 9. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol16/iss2/9 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and 
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
BOOK REVIEWS 
Divine Providence: The Molinist Account, by Thomas P. Flint. Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1998, pp. xi + 258. $35.00. 
WILLIAM HASKER, Huntington College 
Thomas Flint's Divine Providence: The Molinist Account sets a new stan-
dard for the discussion of its topic, a standard that will not soon be sur-
passed or even easily equaled. The book combines rigorous logical 
analysis and ingenious proofs with a lucid, highly readable style and an 
engaging sense of humor. (Many readers may learn here for the first 
time of the Vatican cattle ranch in Montana, where visitors are advised 
to be circumspect so as to avoid being set upon by the papal bulls.) 
The first chapter presents the "twin bases of Molinism," namely the 
traditional conception of divine providence and libertarian free will. 
The traditional conception of providence combines divine foreknowl-
edge and sovereignty in reaching the conclusion that God is "knowingly 
and lovingly directing each and every event and each and every creature 
toward the end he has ordained for them" (p. 12). Flint has no difficulty 
in showing that such a conception has been widely held in the Christian 
tradition, and he appeals both to religious tradition and to philosophical 
argument in building a case for libertarianism. The combination of the 
two he terms "libertarian traditionalism," and he maintains that for the 
orthodox Christian it is "if not the only, then at least the best game in 
town" (p 34). 
Notoriously, difficulties have been encountered in reconciling free 
will with the divine control of all events. Enter, in chapter 2, the Molinist 
account of providence, which shows how God can indeed control the 
course of affairs without interfering with human freedom. God can do 
this because of his knowledge of the" counterfactuals of creaturely free-
dom," which inform him what each free creature would do in any choice 
situation with which it might be confronted; thus God can leave the 
creatures free while taking no chances whatever concerning what they 
may do with their freedom. In this chapter Flint elaborates the Molinist 
position with a good deal of philosophical imagination: we learn of the 
four "moments" of divine knowledge, of creaturely world-types, of 
galaxies of possible worlds, and of possible worlds which are feasible or 
infeasible, chosen, rejected, or culled. 
The third chapter addresses the main alternatives to the Molinist con-
ception of providence, namely Thomism and the "open view" of God. 
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"Thomism" as used here refers, in a general sense, to all varieties of the-
ological determinism; a Protestant might well have spoken instead of 
"Calvinism." The "open view" is so called from the book, The Openness 
of God l ; its most characteristic affirmation is that God's providential gov-
ernance of the world is not guided by comprehensive foreknowledge of 
the consequences of his actions. In a word, God is a risk-taker. 
According to Flint, these are the only significant alternatives available to 
an orthodox Christian; he rightly maintains that neither "simple fore-
knowledge" (foreknowledge without middle knowledge) nor the "eter-
nity solution" represents a distinct alternative. The reason for this is, 
that the divine knowledge of the future posited by simple foreknowl-
edge is of no use whatever to God in his providential governance of the 
world, and the same is true of the timeless knowledge of the future pos-
sessed by God according to the doctrine of divine timelessness.2 The 
doctrine of timelessness can however be combined with theological 
determinism (as it is by most Thomists) or with middle knowledge; in 
principle, then, timelessness is neutral between the three views of provi-
dence, rather than constituting a distinct alternative on its own. 
Having set out the alternatives, Flint argues for the preferability of 
Molinism. Broadly speaking, Thomism is rejected because it is not liber-
tarian, and the open view is rejected because it is not traditional. (We 
will return to one aspect of this discussion later on.) It is noteworthy 
that, while Flint's book contains a good deal of insightful, even scintillat-
ing, philosophical analysis, the positive case for Molinism is based 
almost entirely on theology. Indeed, Flint goes so far as to tax his fellow 
Roman Catholics who affirm the open view (such as Richard Pur till and 
the late Peter Geach) with the question, "whether or not they think 
solemn pronouncements by ecumenical councils are binding on their 
faith, and, if not, what (if anything) they think is binding, and why" (p. 
l02n). Philosophically, there are at least two notable omissions - mat-
ters one might have expected to see addressed which are passed over in 
silence. First, there is no positive metaphysical case made for the exis-
tence of true counterfactuals of freedom, and no attempt at an explana-
tion of how God can know them assuming they exist.' The closest we 
come to this is the observation that ordinary people often accept (in 
effect) the existence of such truths. For example, no one objects that the 
story of the Ghost of Christmas Yet to Come in Dickens' A Christmas 
Carol is impossible on the grounds that there can be no truths of the sort 
that are being revealed to Scrooge - truths about what would occur were 
Scrooge to continue in his present course of life. This may be so, but 
such considerations don't amount to much as support for the metaphys-
ical possibility of such truths. As Flint recognizes, we find tales of time 
travel both enjoyable and apparently coherent, but most philosophers 
consider time travel to be metaphysically impossible. 
The second noteworthy omission is Flint's failure to offer any solution 
to the problem of reconciling divine foreknowledge with libertarian free-
dom for creatures. This is surprising for several reasons: Molinism is 
just as vulnerable to this objection as is any other theory of divine fore-
knowledge; Flint has written on this topic in the past; and there are dif-
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ferent possible solutions which have different implications for the theo-
logical problems he addresses in the last section of the book. 
The next four chapters are occupied with different kinds of objections 
to Molinism and middle knowledge. Chapter 4 considers some tradi-
tional Thomistic attacks, while chapter 5 is devoted to the "grounding" 
objection: What, if anything, is the basis for the truth of the counterfactu-
als of freedom - what makes them true? After several pages of prelimi-
nary sparring Flint comes to what he takes to be the most serious form 
of this objection - and to the best answer to it. A standard view, which 
Flint accepts, holds that a counterfactual is true if and only if its conse-
quent is true in the world closest to the actual world in which the 
antecedent is true. The "grounds" for the truth of the counterfactual, 
then, lie in that "closest possible world" to the actual world. So 
a counterfactual such as (c --7z) is grounded only if Z would be 
grounded if c were true - in other words, only if, in the nearest 
world in which the agent in question is in c, she grounds z - say, 
by performing action Z. But if the agent is truly free then aren't 
there worlds in which she is in c and refrains from performing Z 
that are just as close to our world as any world in which she is in c 
and performs Z? If a Z-less world is just as close to the actual world 
as is a Z-ful one, then the claim that z would be grounded if she 
were in c is false; and if it is false, then our biconditional entails 
that (c --7z) is ungrounded. 
In response to such an objection, Molinists can probably do no 
better than repeat the point made years ago by Plantinga that, in 
comparing worlds, one point of similarity is similarity regarding 
counterfactuals .... [I]f, as Plantinga contends, "one feature deter-
mining the similarity of worlds is whether they share their counter-
factuals," then the Z-ful world may well be more similar to the 
actual world due to the fact that, both in it and in the actual world, 
(c --7z) is true, whereas the same counterfactual is false in the rele-
vant Z-less worlds (pp. 135-36). 
This passage would seem to admit of paraphrase as follows: The coun-
terfactual (c --7z) is true in the actual world because z is true in the world 
nearest the actual world in which c is true, and that world is nearest to 
the actual world because it shares with the actual world the counterfac-
tual (c --7z)! But this appears to be an unusually clear case of circular 
explanation - or "circular grounding" - and there is no reason to sup-
pose such a circle would be virtuous rather than vicious. Molinists, 
however, are well aware of the threatening circle, and take some pains 
to avoid it. Flint, for instance, has told me in correspondence that while 
there is a sense in which "the counterfactual ( c --7z) is true in the actual 
world because z is true in the world nearest the actual world in which c 
is true," the "because" in this sentence, correctly understood, is not 
explanatory. And if it is not, there is no vicious explanatory circle. But 
one may ask, if the "because" in that sentence is not explanatory, then 
what becomes of the answer to the grounding objection? Yet Flint, in 
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the passage quoted above, seems clearly to be presenting what he takes 
to be an answer to that objection. However we may finally interpret 
Flint's position, the following dilemma seems inescapable: If compara-
tive similarity among possible worlds does not provide the grounding 
for the truth of the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, then we have 
been given no answer whatever to the grounding objection. If on the 
other hand comparative similarity does provide such grounding, then 
the charge of vicious circularity returns in full force.' Flint may be look-
ing for a way to escape between the horns of this dilemma, but I don't 
think he can avoid being impaled on one or the other. 
The next two chapters (6 and 7) are occupied with objections to middle 
knowledge put forward by me and by Robert Adams. T have recently dis-
cussed these objections," and will refrain (no doubt to the relief of both 
editor and readers!) from repeating myself here. Flint has mounted a con-
certed counter-attack against these arguments, a counter-attack that he 
considers entirely successful. T disagree, but I must admit that at present I 
see no way to make further progress in resolving this disagreement, or to 
compel the Molinist to concede the soundness of the anti-Molinist argu-
ments. On this topic, readers must reach their own conclusions. 
The final section of the book deals with four specific issues concern-
ing providence - papal infallibility, predictive prophecy, unanswered 
prayer, and "praying for things to have happened." It is widely recog-
nized, even by non-Molinists, that Molinism, if true, should make an 
important contribution to our understanding of God's providential gov-
ernance of the world. But as Flint observes, Molinists have often limited 
themselves to issuing promissory notes, whereas his view is that "the 
time for cashing in such notes has come," and he presents these chapters 
as "early installments in the redemption plan" (p. 180). It is in this sec-
tion that Flint's originality comes most to the fore: so far as I am aware, 
nothing comparably detailed has been attempted before by anyone from 
Molina on down. Interestingly, it turns out to be more difficult to give 
Molinist accounts of these aspects of providence than one might have 
expected. Special difficulties arise at a number of points, to which Flint 
finds suitably ingenious solutions. Whatever one's view of these solu-
tions, he surely is right in wanting Molinists to move on from an "obses-
sion with defense" (p. 179) and to show how their doctrine illuminates 
concrete issues such as these. 
This discussion will conclude with some remarks about the problem of 
evil, and about the contrast on this issue between Molinism and the open 
view of God. Flint questions my claim (which is supported by both Adams 
and Plantinga) that the open view is better placed than Molinism to deal 
with this problem.6 He claims, on the contrary, that "all things considered, 
God's lacking middle knowledge would make the problem of evil even 
more difficult for the Christian to handle. For if God knows only probabili-
ties, then he takes enormous risks in creating significantly free beings: he 
risks creating a world in which many, or most, or even all of his free crea-
tures consistently reject him, a world in which they use their freedom to 
degrade others and themselves. It seems to me that one can reasonably 
argue that a good and loving God would not take such a risk" (p. 107). In 
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response to this, I invite Flint to consider the actual world, in which not all 
(God be thanked!), but certainly many and perhaps most of our fellow-crea-
tures "consistently reject him, ... [and] use their freedom to degrade others 
and themselves." And now consider this question: is this situation easier to 
reconcile with the goodness and love of God if we suppose that every particll-
lar instance of evil and suffering was specifically planned and ordained by God to 
occur?? Or is it better to say that God has indeed taken risks in creating this 
world, and that God's heart is deeply grieved at the grave misuse many of 
us make of our freedom? 
The Molinist view of providence presents to us the idea of a world that 
is, in certain respects, remarkably safe; it is a world in which, "down to the 
smallest detail, things are as they are because God knowingly decided to 
create such a world" (p. 75). In such a world, we think, there may indeed 
be many things whose reasons we do not understand. After all, who are 
we to claim to plumb the secrets of the divine counsels? But there will be, 
there can be, nothing ultimately without a good reason, nothing which does 
not, in the end, playa constructive role in the wise and good plan God has 
for the world. 
Without doubt, many Christians would like to believe we live in such a 
world, and find comfort in the thought that we do. That everything that 
ever happens has its good and sufficient reason in the divine plan, and 
thus nothing is ultimately to be regretted (though many things may cause 
us regret in our present, inevitably short-sighted, view of things) - that 
this should be so is a source of comfort to many. Until, that is, a truly hor-
rendous example of evil confronts us, such as the case of Zosia, a young 
Jewish girl in the Warsaw ghetto, whose eyes were literally ripped from 
their sockets by Nazi soldiers for their own amusement.' Isn't there is 
something obscene about supposing that there is some "greater good" in 
terms of which such an enormity can be justified? The New Testament, in 
contrast, does not view the world as a safe place. On the contrary: as Greg 
Boyd has recently reminded us, the world is seen to be a war zone, and in a 
war zone atrocities and horrendous evils are the norm rather than the 
exception. The ultimate victory of God's cause is not in doubt, but at pre-
sent that victory for the most part is not evident to us. Our God is a fighting 
God, one whose arm is strong and whose final triumph cannot be prevent-
ed - but in the meantime, much can and does happen that is contrary to 
his loving will and purpose for his creatures. It is this vision of God, and 
his providence, that the open view of God seeks to capture.9 
NOTES 
1. Clark Pinnock, Richard Rice, John Sanders, William Hasker, and David 
Basinger, The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding 
of God (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1994). 
2. For argument, see my God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1989), chapter 3. We thus see that, from a certain point of 
view, the denial of comprehensive divine foreknowledge, which is by far the 
most controversial aspect of the open view, is not essential to it. Some adher-
ents of simple foreknowledge, such as Nicholas Wolterstorff, hold conceptions 
of providence extremely similar to that of the open view of God, and the same is 
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true of Linda Zagzebski, who remains undecided between simple foreknowl-
edge and divine timelessness. 
3. In the introduction to his translation of Molina's On Divine Foreknowledge 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), Fred Freddoso writes: "I freely admit 
that the positive task of elaborating a metaphysical and semantic foundation for 
this doctrine [of middle knowledge] is immense and has hardly yet begun" (p. 
75). So far as I can tell, Flint's book does little to change this situation. 
4. According to Alvin Plantinga, "[W]e can't look to similarity, among pos-
sible worlds, as explaining counterfactuality, or as founding or grounding it. 
(Indeed, any founding or grounding in the neighborhood goes in the opposite 
direction.)" ("Replies," in James E. Tomberlin and Peter van lnwagen, eds., 
Alvin Plantinga, Dordrecht: D. Riedel, 1985, p. 378). Here there is clearly no 
vicious explanatory circle, but neither is there an answer to the grounding objec-
tion. 
5. In "Middle Knowledge: A Refutation Revisited," Faith and Philosophy 
12:2 (April 1995), pp. 223-36, and "Explanatory Priority: Transitive and 
UnequivocaJ, A Response to William Craig," Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 57 Oune 1997), pp. 389-93. A correction is needed, however. In the for-
mer article I put forward a definition of 'bring about' as follows: 
S brings it about that Y iff: For some X, S causes it to be the case that X, 
and (X & H)::::} Y, and -(H::::} Y), and -(-X -1 Y) [where H = the past his-
tory of the world up to the moment at which X occurs] 
Partly as a result of a criticism of Flint's (see p. 154), I have come to see that 
the final clause, '-(-X -1 Y)', is a mistake. That clause expresses the idea that 
one should not be said to bring about something that was going to happen any-
way. But, upon reflection, that simply is not correct: that something was going 
to happen anyway may affect the nature of a person's responsibility for bringing 
it about, but it does not change the fact that she brings it about. (If I saw down a 
tree that would have fallen in the next windstorm it is still 1, not the wind, that 
brings it about that the tree is down.) The corrected formula, then, is 
S brings it about that Y iff: For some X, S causes it to be the case that X, 
and (X & H) ::::} Y, and -(H ::::} Y). 
6. This point is merely one instance of a more general truth: the more com-
plete and detailed we suppose God's control over earthly events to be, the more 
difficult it becomes to reconcile the evils that occur with the love and justice of 
God. Thus, I judge the problem of evil to be insoluble for Thomists and other 
theological determinists; to be slightly easier, but still extremely difficult, for 
Molinists; and to be considerably easier for proponents of the open view of 
God. It is of course still easier for process theists, but in order to get this result 
they greatly diminish the power of God to affect worldly affairs, something the 
open view refuses to do. 
7. Note in particular Flint's assertion that "if Judas sins, it is because God 
knowingly put him in a set of circumstances in which he would sin, and know-
ingly refrained from putting him in a set of circumstances in which he would 
act virtuously" (p. 118). 
8. See Gregory A. Boyd, God at War: The Bible and Spiritual Conflict 
(Downers Grove, IlL: InterVarsity, 1997), pp. 33-34. 
9. My thanks to Thomas Flint for his extremely helpful comments on an 
earlier version of this review. 
